The Biden Administration is scrambling to find a responsible way out of Afghanistan by the May 1 deadline for the withdrawal of U.S. troops set by Donald Trump. Problem is, a prudent withdrawal on such a tight timeline is impossible.
“The United States has not ruled out any option,” Secretary of State
Antony Blinken
wrote in a recent letter to Afghan President
Ashraf Ghani.
“I am making this clear to you so that you understand the urgency of my tone.” The U.S. is pushing aggressively for Taliban and Kabul officials to reach a political settlement.
The contents of Mr. Blinken’s letter, along with a more detailed peace plan, don’t give much reason for optimism. Washington has proposed an interim government in which the Taliban shares power with Kabul. Eventually, the country would transition to a democratic government with the current constitution as an “initial template.”
Sounds nice, but the Taliban goal is an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The group said in 2016 that it “has not readily embraced this death and destruction for the sake of some silly ministerial posts.” Researchers at the Long War Journal have spent years documenting the Taliban’s consistency on this point.
Mr. Blinken called for “a 90-day Reduction-in-Violence” to forestall the Taliban’s spring offensive. The group, last year responsible for around twice as many civilian casualties as Afghan national forces were, has rejected such pleas before. Why would they now, especially with the U.S. eagerly eyeing the door?
The U.S. is hoping to lasso China, India, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia to help negotiate and enforce a peace deal. Is that the same Pakistan that has been the Taliban’s primary benefactor for years? The same Iran that has cooperated with the Taliban despite political and religious differences? The same Russia that has provided the Taliban with diplomatic support and perhaps more?
President Biden will need a Plan B if this diplomatic push fails. His campaign website isn’t a bad place to start: “Biden will bring the vast majority of our troops home from Afghanistan and narrowly focus our mission on Al-Qaeda and ISIS.” The alternative is a full withdrawal that would free up the Taliban to conquer more of the country, and perhaps the collapse of the government and a humanitarian disaster.
One benefit of the Taliban negotiations is that the group largely stopped attacking Americans. Staying means endangering American troops. But the U.S. invaded Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11 to neutralize the threat posed by al Qaeda and its Taliban sponsors. The two groups remain connected as the Taliban fails to comply with its assurances to Mr. Trump.
Remaining in Afghanistan doesn’t require a massive commitment. There are as many as 3,500 U.S. troops in the country today, and allies contribute twice as many. The bipartisan Afghanistan Study Group suggests 4,500 Americans are enough “for training, advising, and assisting Afghan defense forces; supporting allied forces; conducting counterterrorism operations; and securing our embassy.”
This is the best advice we’ve seen. There is no easy exit from Afghanistan, but the worst would be a rushed retreat by May 1 that would serve only the Taliban and its jihadist allies.
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Appeared in the March 16, 2021, print edition.